which uses of these technologies to permit and which to discourage or ban. 2 In this article, we examine how therapy and enhancement are characteristically understood in ethical, medical and legal contexts, and how these understandings rely on unstated assumptions about the meanings attributed to different forms of embodiment: normal and disabled, healthy and diseased, able-bodied and impaired, and beautiful and functional. We argue, consistent with feminist and disability studies critiques, that the idea of a 'normal' body as a benchmark against which other bodies are judged is unsustainable despite observing that 'the closer corporeality approximates to a socio-culturally variant position of normativity the more acceptable it becomes'. 3 We track the way in which bodies (within medico-legal and biotechnological discourses) are regulated and managed in relation to shifting normative ideals. This exploration leads us to conclude that the therapy/enhancement distinction is inadequate and unhelpful to guide ethical analysis and medical and regulatory decision making, and cannot adequately assist us in adjudicating when it is appropriate to allow individual choice and autonomy to govern the use of these technologies and when the State should intervene.
In the first part of this article, we critically examine the meaning of enhancement and therapy and draw on feminist and disability studies critiques of normalcy to put pressure on the viability of the distinction.
Conventionally, therapeutic interventions are understood to restore or bring an individual's morphology and capacities within the normal range, while enhancements imply going beyond that which is normal.
The concept of 'normal' embodiment is the fulcrum upon which the therapy/enhancement distinction rests and from which it derives its purchase. Moreover, normatively, the idea of 'normal' or 'normalcy' sets the standard around which bodies are evaluated, regulated and are even permitted to materialise. However, as we argue below, what is 'normal' is 'not only being superceded in practice, but has been unstable all along' 4 and is thus unable to support the therapy/enhancement distinction that rests upon it. While exposing the fallacy of normalcy, we also come to understand that enhancement is a paradox. In its promise of something better, it renders those of us at the base line in a state of inadequacy.
Next, we focus on the idea of prosthesis as offering restoration and also as an 'add-on'. It is the perfect vehicle for deeper exploration of the therapy/enhancement distinction because restoration can never be complete if an add-on is always available to make us better. Using prosthesis as a model, we suggest that the 'normal' body is a theoretical construct dependent upon social and historical contexts.
Finally, using the example of the regulation of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), we demonstrate how laws that prohibit or limit the use of PGD for enhancement purposes and facilitate therapeutic uses of the technology cannot be characterised nor justified on the basis of this distinction. Legal rules based on ideas of 'normal' embodiment are, in fact, normative, constructing both a departure from and congruence with ideas about the normal/normative. In so doing, certain types of embodiment are to rationalize medical attempts to eradicate our differences, and to render all bodies alike -healthy and interchangeable -as sameness is perceived to be the foundation of equality. 13 The effect of this is to secure the social positioning of the disabled as abnormal and deviant rather than simply different. 14 
Scully and
Rehmann-Sutter suggest that this exclusion from the normal may also result in a classification that places the person 'outside the category of being naturally human'. 15 However, as we discuss below, the categories 'normal' and 'disabled' are problematised and confounded when having a disability is simultaneously construed as enabling or giving effect to a 'superability'. Parents of children with autism or Williams Syndrome, for instance, have argued that their children have both extraordinary capacities and incapacities at the same time. 16 The therapy/enhancement distinction is clearly problematic. The concept of enhancement pre-supposes too many certainties about the so-called normal state beyond which it would or should be wrong to journey, while the concept of therapy embraces a standard of health and embodiedness that insists that those who do not meet it should desire to meet it, and need to meet it. The underlying assumption built into the therapy/enhancement distinction, that there are universal ideas of acceptable or desirable embodiment that must be interrogated. 24 Davis suggests that a normal body is a theoretical construct and not a material reality. The norm is an idealised quantitative and qualitative measure that is divorced from (rather than derived from) the observation of bodies, which are inherently variable. Moreover, as Wills contends, 'the prosthetic body will not be an exception but the paradigm for the body itself' 25 as we all attempt to shape, modify and contort our material flesh and blood bodies to fit the theoretical and idealised norm. But, the norm itself is not static, nor are the quantitative and qualitative dimensions used to establish the norm. That which is theoretical, abstract and idealised (the norm as opposed to the material body) is a shifting baseline around which distinctions about therapy and enhancement in relation to material bodies are made. As none of us has a normative body (one that corresponds to a 'universalised template of how corporeality should appear'), 26 it is necessary to critique the standard of normalcy situating it within a shifting social and historical context where the meanings of bodies both in their material and conceptual form are constantly refigured. As Margrit Shildrick suggests:
[t]he claim that there might be a body, any body, that is not modified is surely implausible. Bodies are not static givens, nor do they settle, but rather emerge in both continuous and discontinuous process.
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Nevertheless, she agrees that there is the 'force of socio-cultural and psychic investments in promoting a universalised template of how corporeality should appear'.
28
The idea of the prosthetic is particularly useful here if we consider it not only in its conventional sense of replacing or restoring that which is missing, but as a means to facilitate ways of being that can be more or Wolbring describes, by way of example, several ways to think of a person without legs rather than as disabled:
Let's take a look at a -so called -'disabled person' without legs.
If he/she sees him/herself as a defect in need of legs he/she sees him/herself as a -so called -medical problem in need of fixing. 
B. Proselytising Prosthetics?
Histories of disability reveal the way in which attitudes towards people with, and the meanings ascribed to, anomalous bodies are contingent on broader cultural, economic and social factors. When we are forced to confront the positive alignment of anomalous embodiment with achievement and when this is done not by rendering the anomalies invisible but rather by emphasising their existence, the undesirability of that difference is profoundly challenged. It is not simply that this results in a sympathetic response to anomalous embodiment but more radically that it subverts the account of anomalies as disabling.
Indeed, in some instances, disability has been recast as enhancement.
This is not to question the very material and real consequences of living with a disability in a world that is not organised around that bodily difference, but to question the notion that in supplementing the aberrant body, the aim of prosthetics qua prosthetics is to keep the individual within the 'normal' range.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson scrutinises 'the intersections between the politics of appearance and the medicalisation of subjugated bodies' 33 in order to unpack the categories of disability and normalcy.
She provides a schema of disability with four aspects:
[f]irst, it is a system for interpreting and disciplining bodily variations; second, it is a relationship between bodies and their environments; third it is a set of practices that produce both the able-bodied and the disabled; fourth it is a way of describing the inherent instability of the embodied self. What then is the 'normal' body from which all enhancements and therapies are to be benchmarked? Garland-Thomson argues that the so-called 'natural' body-that which is unmodified by medical intervention in this modern day consumerist universe-is no longer the normal body but rather the modified body is portrayed as normal in its most ideal state. Referring to cosmetic surgery, she says:
The beautiful woman of the twenty-first century is sculpted from top to bottom, generically neutral, all irregularities regularised, all particularities expunged. She is thus nondisabled, deracialised and de-ethnicised. 41 We need to be careful here, however, to distinguish beauty from to name a few, are not ordinary or regular by any stretch of the imagination. Gemma Ward, for instance, has been described as alien in appearance. 42 Normative embodiment, created through cosmetic body modification practices, takes the place of 'natural' embodiment by allowing more people to access the same point on the bell curve. 43 This demonstrates Garland-Thomson's third (and perhaps most important for our purposes) aspect of disability, i.e. it is social practices that construct abled and disabled embodiment. These social practices also construct ideas of super-ability and enhancement.
Sports enhancement is a potent example of how the desire to alter human biology is inextricably tied to existing social structures.
Arguably, athletic excellence only takes on meaning in a field with definite rules and measurable standards. 44 However, he does not go on to address the possibility that those identified as disabled might simultaneously occupy both ends of the curve at once. Aimee Mullins does this in that she is both disabled and a super-model, an amputee and a champion sprinter.
In the context of disability, technologies that add to or modify the body recast the idea of enhancement as enabling transgressive and subversive embodied possibilities rather than simply pushing normativist ableist ideology.
In Aimee Mullins's case, it is unlikely on the basis of her enhanced disability (note it is not enhanced normativity) that it would be accepted that the little girl in the ad should have her legs removed and replaced with prostheses. The problem is that for the superabled disabled person, they still have no foothold in normativity. Rather they go from disability to super-ability without ever stopping at normal and therefore without being able to lay claim to that status.
It is worth recalling Scully and Rehmann-Sutter's analysis of disabled embodiment as leading to an exclusion from the category of the 'naturally human'. 51 Here, however, the individual is simultaneously 'disabled' and enabled. 52 the 'disabled' (mM) of today will set the new norm (normative creep) after they were 'fixed' above the old norm (becoming the new 'non-disabled' (sM)) and the 'non-disabled' (sM) of today will be seen as the new 'disabled' (mM). 54 This may be, paradoxically, a far too utopian vision. If the effect of enhancement technologies is to rewrite the content of the normative categories, then the concern shifts away from the technologies themselves to the hierarchisation of the abled individuals to whom the technologies are applied. Indeed, it is clear that the norm as a form of average or 'species typical functioning' continues to persist. The flaw in Wolbring's account is that individuals can only occupy one status or position in his typology at any one time whereas, in fact, to be both disabled and enhanced or 'superabled' at the same time seems to leave the normative untouched.
What we have been trying to do so far is challenge the standard upon which the idea of enhancement is meant to make sense. Disability, we have shown, is never just that. So, we come back to the question of enhancement but this time understood as containing within it everything we otherwise considered to be merely 'treatment or therapy'.
IV. THE THERAPY/ENHANCEMENT DISTINCTION AS A GUIDE TO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING
The aim of this discussion so far has been to examine the sustainability and efficacy, as a basis for ethical and medical decision-making, of a distinction between those alterations to humans that might be characterised as therapeutic and those that might be characterised as enhancement. In this part of the article, we turn our attention to the usefulness of this distinction for guiding legal limits. We focus on laws that regulate the use and availability of PGD. Legal regimes utilise the concept 'serious disability' as a benchmark for permissible embryo testing using PGD. In most of the legislative instruments regulating the use of PGD, 'serious disability' is not defined. with certain traits that the majority of the community might consider undesirable such as deafness or dwarfism. 56 This suggests that at some future time if it is possible legally and medically that selections may be made not only to achieve traits that the majority of the community perceives to be normal or better than normal but also to achieve traits a niche group perceives as desirable and 'normal' for them, though not typical. What then is the role of law and how should we determine where to draw the legal lines? 57 Canada has not yet promulgated regulations with respect to PGD.
Canada's Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) Act prohibits a number of practices while establishing a regulatory framework for those reproductive practices that are permissible pursuant to license.
With respect to the regulation of PGD, the AHR Act prohibits sex selection except to prevent, treat or diagnose a sex-linked disease or disorder (section 5(e)). In addition, PGD will be governed by the AHR Act pursuant to those sections of the legislation and forthcoming regulations that deal with the collection, alteration, manipulation or treatment of any human reproductive material for the purpose of creating an embryo (sections 10(1) and 10(2)).
While PGD is being carried out in a limited way, and in a regulatory • what counts as a serious genetic condition is controversial;
• there are different perceptions of disability;
• the practice of selecting against some forms of abnormality may threaten the status and equality of opportunity of people who have that form of abnormality;
• the procedures involve the disposal of some healthy embryos; use IVF with PGD to produce a child free of a familial trait that is not obviously associated with disease or disability, it would be unwise to do so to avoid an outcome that, with a level of parental respect and love that any child should be able to expect to receive, would not be a clinically important concern to the child. 68 Sydney IVF makes the standard a disease or disability of 'clinical', rather than social, importance. In these circumstances clinical can be understood to refer to those diseases or disabilities that would require treatment in the clinic. Since all of us require treatment in the clinic at some point, it is clear that what is being referred to here must be something more significant that minor ailments or indeed minor disabilities. Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, each has a different set of criteria to determine when a disability is significant enough to allow it to be avoided via PGD. In all these States, the regulatory regime is vague and the best way to determine what is a disability significant enough to allow PGD is to work in reverse by looking at the conditions for which testing has been approved. 69 These range from single-gene disorders (e.g. cystic fibrosis) or chromosomal disorders 70 such as Trisomy 18, to 'Autosomal recessive conditions where it is proposed to identify and select against carrier embryos in addition to testing for the condition'. 71 The inclusion of carrier embryos is particularly significant because it further tests and questions the usefulness of the therapy/ enhancement distinction. Is it therapy to improve your child's future reproductive potential by ensuring that they will not have to face an adverse reproductive decision when they decide to have children because they carry the gene for a disease or disability that may be passed on?
Selection in favour of a disability is prohibited whether by virtue of the policies of the State-specific regulatory bodies or by compliance with the NHMRC ART Guidelines. 72 In Victoria, the Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA) has issued a policy on the use of PGD that includes a prohibition on the use of PGD for selection in favour of a disability.
While Victorian legislation does not prohibit such a practice, the ITA considers 'selection in favour of genetic disease or abnormality'
'inconsistent' with the first guiding principle of the Act 73 (that 'the welfare and interests of any person. . .to be born. . .are paramount'). The current policy of the HFEA therefore appears to be preserved under the proposed amendments of the Bill-to test using PGD, there must be a significant risk of a serious physical/mental disability/illness/medical condition.
In addition, the proposed HFE amendments contain an explicit prohibition on the use of PGD to select in favour of a disability.
Clause 14 of the HFE Bill proposes a new subsection 13(9), which prohibits 'preferring' those 'embryos... known to have a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality' above those 'not known to have such an abnormality'. 80 As the Explanatory Notes emphasise, this new licence condition prevents 'similar situations to cases, outside the UK, where positive selection of deaf donors in order deliberately to result in a deaf child have been reported'. 81 The legislative attempts to regulate the uses of PGD in Australia and the UK rely (in part) upon a concept of serious condition or disability as the condition precedent for authorising the use of genetic testing of the embryo. Implicit in this standard is a concern about curtailing the use of PGD to design or tailor the characteristics of one's progeny, indeed to use PGD to screen for certain desired and desirable characteristics or traits. By confining the use of PGD to testing for serious conditions or disabilities, its status as a therapeutic technique is sought to be preserved.
In this way, an ethical distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic selection (enhancement) has been written into the law by using 'serious disability' as the benchmark. However, the legislated use of the language of 'abnormality' in the UK and Australian legislation clearly suggests a stable and knowable norm against which these determinations can be made. As we have argued though, the concept of normal embodiment is unsustainable as both a material fact and normative goal. The prohibition of favouring an affected embryo, while not legislating directly with respect to enhancement, clearly posits a normative standard below which (rather than above which) it is not possible to 'design'. We conclude therefore by challenging the appropriateness of imposing a system of regulatory constraints such as those described above on these technologies which enable or constrain alteration by means of selection given their reliance on assumptions about the meaning of disability, abnormality and normalcy and the corelated reliance on an unsustainable distinction between therapy and enhancement to offer ethical, medical and regulatory limits.
